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1 
Introduction 
 There is currently an emphasis on, and a demand for, the Intelligence Community and 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement to develop and maintain public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) with the private sector.   The purposes of these partnerships is two-fold; 1) Enhance 
information sharing to prevent or mitigate threats, and 2) Enhance emergency preparedness and 
response efforts to “all threats and all hazardsi”.  However, in light of current demands, little – if 
any – attention has been given to the subtleties of these partnerships.  A misunderstanding of 
partnership expectations coupled with poor structures for cooperation creates barriers to success 
from the beginning of these partnerships, thus predisposing them to ineffectiveness and failure.  
The intent of this article is to provide both pragmatic insights for those practitioners tasked with 
the responsibility of creating and maintaining PPPs as well as research insights for academics 
interested in examining factors related to successful PPPs for homeland security.   
 
Demand for Public-Private Partnerships  
 A variety of government reports and initiatives – many with implications for policies and 
standards - identify the need to develop effective PPPs for homeland security and law 
enforcement.  In 2002, President George W. Bush released the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security that operationalized homeland security and the means by which it would be achieved.  
Paramount to this end was the acknowledgement of non-government organizations – specifically 
the private sector – and the vital role they play in achieving a “secure homeland” (Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002).  A year later, President Bush reinforced this need when he signed 
Presidential Homeland Security Directive-8 that outlined a variety of security facets in which 
public and private sector organizations needed to cooperate and establish policies to strengthen 
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the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies (White House, 2003).  Soon after, the 
9/11 Commission Report was released identifying the failure of public and private sector entities 
to effectively cooperate with one another in light of the attacks of September 11th, 2001.  In 
response to these shortcomings, the United States Department of Justice released the National 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) which posits federal, state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies must recognize and partner with the private sector in order to detect and 
prevent attacks to the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources and that steps should be 
taken to establish regular communications and methods of information exchange (United States 
Department of Justice [USDOJ], 2003).   
Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Assistance acknowledged in a report, Engaging the 
Private Sector to Promote Homeland Security: Law Enforcement-Private Security Partnerships, 
that to effectively protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, law enforcement and private 
security must work collaboratively because neither have the resources to do so alone (Bureau of 
Justice Assistance [BJA], 2005).  The creation of state and regional fusion centersii is further 
driving the public-private partnership initiative. The Fusion Center Guidelines, published by the 
Department of Justice, express cooperation with the private sector as being an “ultimate goal” 
(USDOJ, 2004).  Moreover, the Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment explains 
that private sector information represents a crucial element in both understanding the current 
threat environment and protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure from targeted attacks.  
Protecting the nation’s infrastructure also requires a robust public-private partnership that 
provides the private sector with information on incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities, as well as 
protects proprietary information. 
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 Origins of Public-Private Partnerships 
The present emergence and demand for public-private partnerships within homeland 
security and law enforcement is not a new concept, nor is it unique to criminal justice.  Public-
private partnerships can be defined as arrangements between government and private sector 
entities for the purpose of providing public infrastructure, community facilities and related 
services. Such partnerships are characterized by the sharing of investment, risk, responsibility 
and reward between the partners (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002).  It is important to note that 
public agencies that contract with the private sector to fulfill services as well as instances of 
funding or granting opportunities are not examples of PPPs (Peters, 1998; Lawther, 2000; 
Ingerson, 1999) and can perhaps be classified or studied under the umbrella of different 
terminology, such as intergovernmental management, intergovernmental relations, or federalism 
(Wright, 1983). 
The concept of U.S. government agencies acting interdependently to provide a more 
comprehensive service to the public is not a contemporary phenomenon.  In an article published 
in 1887, Woodrow Wilson depicted the importance of such partnerships by emphasizing their 
interdependent cooperation and mutual helpfulness.  However, this approach of 
intergovernmental cooperation did not involve a private sector component.  Though PPPs have 
been traced in European history to the 16th century (Savitch, 1998) and to the 1880s in the US 
(Beauregard, 1998), the term and practice of “public-private partnership” for reference in this 
discussion originated during the Carter administration in an effort to aid the US housing 
economy.  Specifically, the National Urban Policy of 1978 identified the demand for and 
benefits of PPPs.  As a result of inflating interest rates and limitations imposed on taxes, US 
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cities were beginning to experience a loss of public services as well as an increase of 
homelessness and foreclosures within the low-income households (Lyall, 1986).  In short, it was 
determined that public funds invested jointly with private sector support to develop public-
private partnerships to increase economic development in which the private sector was thought 
to have an potential gains.  These partnerships were not designed to replace government 
initiatives, but to supplement them as a tool.  The argument was that depleting economic stability 
in large US cities would hinder all aspects of both public and private operations alike – thus the 
need to cooperate (Lyall, 1986).  
 The reach of PPPs increased as “new federalismiii” arrived along with the Reagan 
administration.  While a decrease in government funding to assist private and non-government 
organizations began during the Carter administration, the true impact began to come to fruition 
during Reagan’s tenure.  The lack of federal funds to assist a variety of public services resulted 
in an increased demand for partnerships.  The most notable service areas included health, social, 
housing and community development, employment and training, law enforcement, and income 
assistance (Musselwhite, 1986; Hudzik, 1987).  Despite this economic environment providing 
the circumstances by which PPPs evolved out of necessity, the lack of government funding to 
these service areas also weakened existing PPPs (Musselwhite, 1986) – the lack of funding also 
caused a ripple in the balance of invested resources and risk within the existing PPPs.   
 The influence of government regulations is perhaps the most salient factor driving the 
necessity and evolution of PPPs.  This is evident across a variety of different arenas.  Armenakis 
and Bedeian (1999) discussed contextual issues that create environmental influences.  Most 
studies in this arena build from numerous other studies related to external environmental 
influences on organizations (Finstad, 1998).  The majority of environmental influence research in 
5 
 
this area focuses on the private sector, such as the competitive health care industry (Meyer et al., 
1990), the deregulation of the airline industry (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991) and the savings and 
loan industry (Haveman, 1992).   
 
Public-Private Partnerships and Criminal Justice 
 Given the emergence of PPPs across different industries and the gaps they intend to 
close, it is necessary to discuss the origin of PPPs within the criminal justice arena to provide 
context for where PPPs have been utilized in criminal justice organizations and where they 
intend to close gaps within homeland security priorities.  The cooperation among public and 
private sector entities in the criminal justice arena have been in existence since the 1960s when 
private security and public police began to share similar responsibilities and jurisdictions.  
Historically, private security and law enforcement agencies have been unable to cooperate 
effectively (Greene et al., 1995).  The Private Security Advisory Council identified two main 
factors which contributed to poor relationships between law enforcement and private security in 
1976: 1) incongruence of role expectations, and 2) and two-way stereotyping (May, 1998).  
The Hallcrest Report (1985) also examined the relationships between law enforcement 
and private security.  This report acknowledged public law enforcement should, and did, allow 
private security to operate similar practices to those of law enforcement (NIJ, 1985a).  Perhaps 
more pertinent to the demand for PPPs are the facts illustrated in the second edition of the report 
where it acknowledged private security employed approximately 1.5 million people operating 
with an annual budget of $52 billion.  Conversely, federal, state, local and tribal agencies 
employed approximately 600,000 individuals and operated with a $30 billion budget (NIJ, 
1985b).  This report also noted the increased growth of private security and the limited growth of 
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law enforcement could be attributed to four main factors: 1) increasing workplace crime, 2) 
increasing fear of crime, 3) a decreasing rate of spending for public protection, and 4) increasing 
awareness and use of private security effective protective measures (Gunter and Kidwell, 2004). 
As noted by Gunter and Kidwell (2004), the focus of public and private sector 
engagement in the criminal justice arena has shifted from independent action towards mutual 
cooperation.  As an example, in the 1980s, Operation Cooperation was established to encourage 
public-private teamwork.  This operation, funded by the U.S. Department of Justice in 
partnership with the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), represented a national 
initiative to encourage partnerships between law enforcement and private security organizations 
(Connors et al., 2000).  Examples of programs established through this initiative are the Pooling 
Resources in Defense of our Environment (PRIDE), Virginia Police and Private Security 
Alliance (VAPPSA), Dallas/North Texas Regional Law Enforcement and Security Program 
(LEAPS), and Area Police/Private Security Liaison (APPL) (Conners et al., 2000).  
These approaches reflect similar concepts discussed within crime control literature as 
third-party policing.  Third party policing describes police efforts to persuade or coerce third 
parties, such as landlords, parents, and local business owners, to take some responsibility for 
preventing crime or reducing crime problems (Mazerolle and Ransley, 2005).  The intent of this 
practice is to create cooperative consultation with community members to help law enforcement 
facilitate crime prevention and control.  Through these cooperative consultations with the 
community, law enforcement hopes to persuade the third party participant to mitigate the 
potential for crime to occur in their environment by removing or reducing certain aspects of that 
environment.  For example, in Australia, law enforcement has cooperated with the taxation 
department investigators to work with companies to reduce tax fraud (Grabosky, 1995).   
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 Public-Private Partnerships to Enhance Emergency Management  
 Post-9/11, PPPs have been most commonly practiced in the criminal justice arena as a 
tool to aid in the facilitation of emergency response and preparedness.  A lesson learned from the 
events of 9/11 is the need for cooperation across all levels of public and private sectors to better 
respond and prepare for emergency situations (i.e. terrorist attacks, biological or chemical 
attacks, and natural disasters).  The Department of Homeland Security acknowledges that the 
private sector – which operates approximately 85 percent of the US critical infrastructure – is a 
vital homeland security partner.  The private sector offers a variety of information that is 
imperative to protecting the US from terrorism and other disasters – such as the development of 
information systems, vaccines, detection devices, and other technologies and innovations that aid 
to secure the homeland (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2002:vii). 
 In an attempt to meet the demands for PPPs in emergency management, multiple 
organizations and programs have been developed to aid public and private sector organizations 
in developing and sustaining these types of relationships.  One such group is the Business 
Executives for National Security (BENS) which is a national, non-partisan organization, that 
aims to assist senior business executives to help enhance the nation's security (BENS, 2008).  In 
a 2007 report produced by BENS, it was noted that the government alone cannot manage major 
crises nor effectively integrate the private sector after a crisis occurs and that, with few 
exceptions, durable, collaborative relationships do not currently exist.  An example of a BENS 
initiative currently in progress is a collaborative effort between Safeguard Iowa and Wal-Mart.  
In short, Safeguard Iowa – a PPP – and Wal-Mart are attempting to identify logistics to put in 
place to respond effectively and efficiently to biological or chemical attacks.  Since Wal-Mart 
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currently has the infrastructure in place (i.e. stores, trucks, and personnel) and operates in 
locations throughout the state of Iowa that all persons have ready access to, they serve as an ideal 
distributor of vaccines to the public.   
 A second example of assistance for public and private agencies to build these 
relationships is the Critical Incident Protocol-Community Facilitation Program at Michigan 
State Universityiv.  This program was developed to facilitate partnerships between the public and 
private sectors in an attempt to collaborate on how to more effectively and efficiently respond, 
prepare, and recover from critical incidents (CIP, 2008).  This program puts forth a six-step 
model for successful emergency response PPPs (as taken directly from the program’s website): 
1. Identify public and private sector stakeholders to co-share leadership 
2. Ask leaders to bring others to the table 
3. Identify common issues on emergency preparedness for collaboration 
4. Identify new resources in the community to mitigate the impact of critical incidents 
5. Determine the challenges that participating organizations encounter 
6. Create sustainability in the partnership by conducting a needs assessment, setting goals, 
and scheduling tasks performance 
 
As outlined in these six steps, the focus of the partnership for emergency response is to ensure all 
members in the community are aware of possible threats and have created an agreed upon a 
response to those possible threats – both the predictable and unpredictable.  
An example of this type of partnership for emergency preparedness is the King County 
Office of Emergency Management’s (KCOEM) 3 Days, 3 Ways, Are You Ready? which is a 
preparedness campaign to inform residents how to prepare for disasters.  This initiative 
encourages citizens to prepare a response to a disaster for a minimum of three days in three 
different ways (Holdeman and Quick, 2006).  The KCOEM developed the initiative in 2005 as a 
tool to motivate individuals to prepare themselves for natural disasters and terrorist attacks.  The 
KCOEM partnered with radio station KOMO, the Seattle Mariners professional baseball team, 
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the American Red Cross (ARC), and Phillips Medical Systems to promote awareness of the “3 
Days, 3 Ways, Are You Ready?” initiative during the Mariners’ baseball season.    
The program combines printed advertisements, outreach, and giveaways.  The Mariners 
included a half-page advertisement for the campaign in their information program for season 
ticket holders at the start of the season.  Citizen Corps volunteered personnel to work an 
information booth about the program at 15 Mariners home games.  Furthermore, a disaster kit 
backpack was given away after the Mariners scored their first two runs during home games.  All 
participating organizations provided financial support for the program.  The KCOEM used its 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding.  KOMO matched every UASI dollar with a 
donation of $2.50 in air time. The Seattle Mariners contributed the advertising and booth space 
while Phillips Medical Systems donated the kits for the giveaway.  The ARC donated the 
backpacks and the program logo design.  The KCOEM utilized private partnerships to promote 
the initiative to the public. This allows King County to spread its message of preparedness to a 
more broad audience (Holdeman and Quick, 2006).    
 
Structure of Public-Private Partnerships 
 An aspect of PPPs that deserves discussion is the often over-looked nature of PPPs as 
having multiple levels of involvement.  The concept of a partnership involves an inherent level 
of commitment on behalf of each member.  However, the level of commitment, and therefore 
benefit of the partnership, varies.  Stakeholders’ expectations of outcomes vary in proportion to 
the investment in the partnership.  While PPPs are recommended and desired by public agencies 
and viewed in positive light by the private sector, they are not required by law to engage with 
one another.  As such, a key component in the equation of successful PPPs is voluntary 
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commitment.  A prerequisite for the development of voluntary cooperative partnerships is that all 
participants expect to increase positive outcomes as a result of the partnership as compared to the 
outcomes that would result from a failure to cooperate.    
The Committee for Economic Development published a policy book discussing a similar 
issue.  The book noted successful partnership efforts have both a policy dimension and an 
operational dimension. The policy dimension encompasses a process that produces consensus on 
community goals, agreement on institutional roles, and sustained support for action (Committee 
for Economic Development [CED], 1982).  The operational dimension consists of three general 
forms: 1) private initiative for public benefit, 2) government initiative to facilitate or encourage 
private activity in the public interest, and 3) joint ventures by government and private 
organizations (CED, 1982).  Furthermore, the publication noted a legitimate arena for 
partnership activities included bolstering key community services which included safety.  These 
fundamental differences in the nature of PPPs and the purposes they are designed to serve will be 
discussed later on in this paper as they relate to an incongruence of expected outcomes.   
 Private initiative partnerships for public benefit are instances in which the private sector 
determines a method or practice that will aid the public sector – typically with respect to 
operations or management of tasks.  The BENS group provides another example of this type of 
partnership where a private sector company that specializes in information technology and 
manages logistics for several large US companies offers to provide this service to the 
Department of Defense.  The private company asserts they can provide a more quality service at 
a quarter of the price (Taibl, 1999) – hence initiating a partnership where the public sector 
benefits.  This type of partnership is at times difficult to delineate from outsourcing.  The 
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distinguishing factor being the advantage provided to the public, not in the form of reduced 
prices for commercial products.  
 Government initiative to facilitate or encourage private activity in the public interest 
encompasses emergency management.  These are instances where the government has initiated a 
collaborative effort between the public and private sectors in the best interest of public safety.  
Private organizations as a whole do not stand to significantly benefit – if at all – from this form 
of partnership.  They perhaps more appropriately serve as a crutch for the public sector in times 
of need.  There is a lack of constant collaboration as a result of the partnership being based on a 
“need be” basis.  When disasters occur, the private sector comes to aid the public sector’s 
attempt to respond effectively to the disaster.  This form of partnership can possibly be attributed 
to corporate citizenship – or corporate philanthropy (Porter and Kramer, 2002) – which is the 
obligation of a private business to operate in the best interest of the community it finds itself.  It 
was normally deemed as something good for the organization to do as long as it benefited 
stakeholders (McIntosh, 1998).   
 Joint ventures are partnerships in which all parties stand to benefit from the partnership.  
This form is most evident with respect to information sharing.  While emergency management 
PPPs are based on “need be” engagement, information sharing PPPs are a constant two-way 
relationship where each party stands to gain valuable information that directly influences their 
operations.  As such, these partnerships are pursued by both the public and private sector.  
However it should be noted that only recently have private sector businesses began to illicit the 
cooperation of federal, state, and local law enforcement to aid the prevention of threats to their 
company assets and operations.  
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 Each form of these partnerships requires a different level of interdependence among its 
partners.  Gray (1985) refers to interdependencies among stakeholders in the decision to 
participate in partnerships.  Partnerships put participants in more desirable situations if (a) by 
pooling their resources, they obtain efficiencies; and/or (b) by combining complementary 
strengths, they can increase the scope of their activities.  Coordination of resources and 
information is necessary for interdependence to be established (Blau and Schoenhern, 1971).  
Building from March and Simon’s (1958) work, Thompson (1967) identified the necessary 
coordination needed for successful interdependencies in distinctly different natures of 
partnerships.   
 Coordination through standardization is necessary in situations where rules and routines 
constrain the actions of each partner in order to observe consistency (Thompson, 1967).  This 
form of coordination is utilized in instances of pooled interdependence where the agencies 
involved are asked to provide their own discrete contributions, but do not necessarily have to 
work directly with one another during the process (O’Toole and Montjoy, 1984).  An example of 
this would be the sharing of information with state or regional fusion centers.  Rules and 
regulations must be observed for accurate and legal information sharing, but partners may 
provide information to the center in raw form that serves as a contribution, but partners do not 
deal directly with the fusion center during the process of gathering the information – they simply 
deliver the information.  
 Coordination by plan is most beneficial in circumstances where the environment is 
unstable and dynamic.  Sequential interdependence utilizes this form of coordination where the 
planned actions of partnerships are governed with respect to environmental tasks (Thompson, 
1967).  This form of interdependence often involves the outcomes of one partner serving as the 
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inputs of another (O’Toole and Montjoy, 1984).  An important note of sequential 
interdependence is the level of interdependence increases as the dependence on inputs increases.  
Such as the fusion center example, the fusion center has the highest dependence on the outcomes 
of the other partners since they are at the end of the outcome chain.  If the outcomes of law 
enforcement agencies and the private sector begin to diminish, so do the inputs, and therefore, 
outcomes of the fusion center.   
 Lastly, coordination by mutual adjustment involves the transmission of new information 
and resources during the process of action (Thompson, 1967) - as situations become more 
unpredictable, reliance on coordination by mutual adjustment increases (March and Simon, 
1958).  Mutual adjustment relies on a reciprocal interdependence structure because of the 
constantly evolving environment requires each partner to require and produce outputs that are 
simultaneously used as outputs of another partner (O’Toole and Montjoy, 1984).  This form of 
coordination and interdependence applies to the emergency management partnerships.  As events 
unfold and the environment of the partnership – i.e. disasters and emergencies – grows uncertain, 
partners will rely on one another for emerging information and resources to cope with changing 
environmental demands.   
 This section has identified critical organizational, political, and structure components that 
influence the creation, sustainment, and effectiveness of public-private partnerships.  Perhaps 
most important is the context of the partnership and the nature of the outcomes the partnership is 
designed to produce.  These contrasts have implications for effectiveness that will be discussed 
in the following section.  Table 5 summarizes the types of partnerships, interdependence, and 
coordination discussed.   
Table 5: Structuring of public-private partnerships 
  
Private Sector Initiative 
 
Government Initiative 
 
Joint Venture Initiative 
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Type of 
Interdependence 
 
 
Pooled 
 
Reciprocal 
 
Sequential 
Type of Coordination Standardization Mutual adjustment Standardization / By 
Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example partnership  
 
Private information 
management companies 
providing logistics for 
the Department of 
Defense 
• Increase in 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
• Decrease in cost 
 
 
Emergency management 
plans where public 
services are aided by 
private companies 
• Increase in 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of 
emergency 
response delivery 
• Increased 
preparedness 
 
Information sharing 
partnerships among 
federal, state, and local 
law enforcement and the 
private sector 
• Both parties 
gain access to 
information that 
was previously 
unavailable 
• This information 
guides 
operations for a 
more effective 
response to 
threats 
 
 
Conflicts of Interest: Same Processes, Different Outcomes 
 The previous section begins to acknowledge a conflict of interest that exists between 
public sector law enforcement and private sector companies.  These conflicts of interest arise out 
of a contrast in nature between the intent of public sector law enforcement intelligence functions 
and those of private sector organizations.  As such, this conflict serves as the primary barrier to 
effective PPPs and will be explained in more detail.  The intelligence cycle practiced by most 
public and private sector organizations it similar – collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, 
reporting, and dissemination (Carter 2004).  For purposes of this discussion, each step of this 
cycle will not be discussed in great detail; however the differences between the approaches taken 
by the public and private sector will be focused upon – specifically with respect to the intent for 
outcomes of each intelligence function.   
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 Intelligence functions within state, local and tribal agencies attempt to identify threats to 
public safety and produce actionable intelligencev on which operational responses can be based 
to prevent or mitigate the threat.  Raw information is fed into the cycle via suspicious activity 
reports and overt or covert sources.  Information is evaluated for source reliability and 
information validity.  Once information is deemed legitimate, it is collated into appropriate 
schemas then passed along for analysis in which analysts derive conclusions about the 
information based upon multiple activity, event, commodity, and link analyses.  These analyses 
provide forecasts and estimates by which reports can be formulated for tactical and strategic 
responses and thereby disseminated to those who “need to know”.  These reports serve as 
actionable intelligence to drive the operations of law enforcement agencies. The intent of these 
operations is to prevent harmful threats or hazards from reaching fruition.   
  Similar, yet different, intelligence functions within private sector organizations attempt 
to identify threats to personnel, facilities, processes, products and the supply chain that can cause 
disruption to the enterprise and produce actionable intelligence on which operations can be based 
to prevent or mitigate the threat.  As such, the climate in which information sharing occurs in the 
private sector should be briefly explained.  Information sharing in the private sector can be 
viewed somewhat as a “quid pro quo” relationship.  Currently no rules, regulations, or mandates 
are in place requiring private organizations to share information with one another – and likely 
never will exist given proprietary concerns.  It is the byproduct of a professional rapport built 
upon trust and even exchange.  Many private organizations are independent of one another – in 
most cases entirely separate markets - but share common interests with respect to their areas of 
operation or production – and hence, common interests related to threats.   
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For example, if a shipping company working in the same port as a commercial cruise line 
company becomes aware of an event or problems that may affect those who operate in the port, 
they could provide that information to the cruise line.  As a result, the cruise line could plan 
accordingly with respect to logistics so their business continues to operate as smooth as possible.  
The quid pro quo relationship for information sharing would involve the cruise line “returning 
the favor” to the shipping company if they were to become aware of similar information.  
Ideally, this process would become formalized with liaisons and agreements.  These relationships 
are not confined to organizations that do not compete with one another.  In the banking industry, 
Bank of America and Citibank are competitors who share information to provide assistance to 
one another.  An example of this being extremists who hold protests against companies doing 
certain types of business.  If Bank of America were holding an annual conference and an 
extremist group showed up to protest, Bank of America would begin to monitor the group’s 
website (open source intelligence) and while doing so notices the website indicates the group 
would hold the same type of protest at an upcoming Citibank conference.  A member of Bank of 
America’s assets protection division would call a Citibank to alert them and share some tactics 
Bank of America has identified to help mitigate the protestors.  
Keeping this form of information sharing relationship in context, the intelligence cycle 
operates in similar fashion, but with different outcomes.  Raw information enters the intelligence 
function through collection, but also delivery – the former represented in the above scenario.  
Collection efforts are driven by priorities from the organizational hierarchy – i.e. executives 
wanting information on an area before a large company event or in response to re-occurring 
problems facing the company.  Two examples can provide a more accurate understanding.  First, 
before buying property to build a distribution warehouse in a community, executives want to be 
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aware of criminal threats in the area that may threaten the warehouse operations and personnel.  
Second, before entering into an overseas market, executives want to know criminal, health, and 
safety threats to personnel, facilities, and supply chain before making an investment.   
The evaluation process is similar, but perhaps does not play as large of a role in private 
companies given that information is typically provided by sources already validated (other 
businesses) and issues regarding adherence to legal protections (e.g. civil rights) and policy do 
not apply.  Collation, analysis, reporting, and dissemination methods are inherently the same as 
those in law enforcement agencies; however the target of these processes is to produce actionable 
intelligence for a different purpose.  The intent of intelligence functions within private 
organizations is to provide actionable intelligence to protect company assets through preparing 
for, and responding to, situations where the company’s financial operations are at risk.   
Summarizing the two similar, but different, intelligence functions of public and private 
organizations provides a foundation on which to explain the lack of effectiveness when these two 
sectors attempt to share information with one another.  Public law enforcement agencies work 
together in a reactive fashion because – to a certain extent – they are being told they have to do 
so in order to become consistent with national standards.  Conversely, private sector companies 
work together proactively because the parties involved stand to benefit financially from an 
effective partnership.  This is an important aspect to keep in mind when theorizing why these 
partnerships are not functioning effectively.   
Given the nature of public law enforcement information sharing, agencies share 
information and provide feedback to one another on a “need to know” or “right to know” basis.  
If a law enforcement agency provides information to another agency because it is requested, it is 
viewed as a one-way transaction, rarely involving any type of feedback mechanism.  The nature 
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of private sector information sharing is to provide information on a “you might need to know” 
basis.  Given this delivery of information without a request, the feedback of information is more 
likely to occur – i.e. companies are more likely to reciprocate or provide follow-up information. 
A misunderstanding of expectations occurs when public and private organizations share 
information.  Currently, public sector law enforcement agencies tend to request and accept 
information more readily than they reciprocate whereas private sector companies except 
feedback on the information they have provided, but it is rarely received.  The lack of feedback 
on behalf of law enforcement agencies is intermixed with a host of other issues including, but not 
limited to, private sector personnel receiving classified information, determining the extent to 
which private companies “need to know” information and the public sector’s ability to protect 
proprietary information.  
 
Conclusion 
 For law enforcement, public-private partnerships are critical for preventing and 
responding to “all hazards”.  For the private sector, public-private partnerships are critical for 
effectively and efficiently protecting company assets and practices.  Both sectors stand to either 
gain or lose effectiveness if the issues discussed in this article are not given adequate attention.  
Misunderstandings among those involved with respect to expectations can lead to ineffective 
communication and deteriorated performance of the partnership, thus limiting positive outcomes 
and wasting resources.  The creation of many partnerships as a result of “knee jerk” reactions to 
the current environmental demands provides opportunities to evaluate what is and is not 
working.  More importantly, consideration needs to be given to the informalities tightly coupled 
with the creation and sustainment of these partnerships.  
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i “All threats and all hazards” refers to the Department of Homeland Security’s focus on not only terrorism, but 
natural disasters, crime, and biological weapons to name a few. This focus is emphasized in the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Analysis Priorities.  
ii A fusion center is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and intelligence, maximize 
resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety 
of sources (USDOJ, 2004).  
iii New Federalism refers to the transfer of certain powers from the United States federal government to the U.S. 
states to restore states’ autonomy that was lost as a result of Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
iv For more information regarding the CIP – Community Facilitation Program, funded by the Training and Exercise 
Secretariat, FEMA-DHS, please visit www.cip.msu.edu 
v Actionable intelligence is intelligence that includes explicit information and permits the development of some form 
of tactical or strategic action or plan. 
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